The Space Wolves, known in their own dialect of Juvjk as the Vlka Fenryka or "Wolves of Fenris. IMDbPro.com offers expanded company and employee contact details for over 62,600 companies in the entertainment industry as well as representation listings for over. ![]() 1 I celebrate myself, and sing myself, And what I assume you shall assume, For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. I loafe and invite my soul. The 82nd Airborne Division is an elite airborne infantry division of the United States Army, specializing in parachute assault operations into denied areas. Audie Murphy photographed in 1948 wearing the U.S. Army khaki "Class A" (tropical service) uniform with full-size medals. The 9th Bomb Squadron 9 BS is a squadron of the United States Air Force. It is assigned to the 7th Operations Group, Global Strike Command, stationed at Dyess Air. Battle for Kasserine Pass: 1st Armored Division Were Ambushed by the Afrika Corps at Sidi Bou Zid. World War IIAngry winds from the sahara lashed the mountains and plains of central Tunisia just before dawn on Sunday, February 1. St. Valentine’s Day. The howling currents and swirling dust cloaked the maneuvers of advancing German armored battle groups. Company Of Heroes Patch InstallationsprogrammAt 0. 40. 0 hours, with resolute purpose, elements of the crack 1. Panzer divisions had launched an attack through Faid and Maizila passes. The German tanks were bound for the village of Sidi Bou Zid, where General Dwight D. Eisenhower himself had inspected forward American troop dispositions just three hours earlier. The panzer groups were implementing a plan personally approved by Adolf Hitler and calculated to relieve the pressure on Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. To the east, British General Bernard L. Montgomery’s Eighth Army, which had chased Rommel from Egypt, was gathering strength for a final assault. Rommel’s western flank was likewise threatened by imminent Allied incursions through the passes of the Eastern Dorsal, a mountain chain running from the Miliane River to Maknassy. The ‘Desert Fox’ viewed the interminable retreat from Egypt with disdain and longed for an opportunity to resume the offensive. To avoid being trapped in a tightening vise, he turned and struck first. The Kasserine campaign, the first major clash between the American and German armies in World War II, had begun. The essence of Rommel’s plan was to counterthrust through those mountain passes, penetrate deeply to the northwest and completely disrupt the Allied rear. He meant to deal the Americans a resounding defeat that would instill a feeling of inferiority in the green troops and give his hard- pressed army some breathing room. Facing the Germans were fragmented units of the 1st Armored Division, stretched thin to cover a 6. It was the first American division to engage the Germans in combat, the first to fight in the desert and, ironically, the only one of the 1. U. S. armored divisions in World War II not to receive any desert warfare training. On that fateful morning, German Panzerkampfwagen Mk. IVs, backed by new, 6. Pzkw. MK. VI Tigers, churned over, through and around the American lines. Lieutenant General Heinz Ziegler, the deputy to Col. Gen. Hans von Arnim, led the attacking force. Spearheading Operation ‘Spring Wind’ was the 5. Tiger Detachment. The 7th Panzer and 8. Panzergrenadier regiments supported that shock force. Spring Wind had four thrust points: Kampfgruppe (KGr.) Gerhardt rolled around the northern edge of Djebel Lessouda, while KGr. Reimann advanced directly along the road from Faid. To the south, units of the 2. Panzer Division poured through Maizila Pass and divided into two groups to encircle Sidi Bou Zid. KGr. Schuette advanced to the north and KGr. Stenkhoff to the west. Forward elements of the Americans’ 1. Regimental Combat Team, divided among the Lessouda, Garet Hadid and Ksaira djebels (hills), were bypassed and quickly marooned. At least 2,0. 00 men were trapped. They had been imprudently placed there by the II Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, who had never even visited the front lines. Strenuous efforts to hold the line continued through the morning. At midday, 5. 1 M- 4 Sherman tanks of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, rolled out to engage the enemy. A fierce fight ensued, resulting in the loss of 4. The noble sacrifice, brilliantly led by Lt. Col. Louis I. Hightower, temporarily delayed the panzers’ progress. But by dusk, the Germans had captured Sidi Bou Zid. Having achieved their objective, they halted, satisfied to consolidate their gains. At 2. 32. 0 hours that Sunday, after driving through the night, Lt. Col. James D. Alger arrived at the Tunisian farmhouse that would become the headquarters for Combat Command (CC) C of the U. S. II Corps. ‘Gentleman Jim’ Alger’s 2nd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, had raced from its concealed bivouac near Maktar to an assembly area at an outpost south of Hadjeb el Aioun. As his tankers refueled, Alger awaited the arrival of Colonel Robert I. Stack and his party from division headquarters. They were carrying his counterattack orders. The easygoing Alger had walked into a desperate and fluid situation that evening. The Germans knew that the American infantry forces were trapped on the Lessouda and Ksaira hills, and planned to obliterate them. The American commanders in the rear prepared to counterattack the next morning in order to rescue the isolated infantry, retake Sidi Bou Zid and drive the Germans back. In the vanguard of the counterattacking force would be Alger’s 2nd Battalion. It had never been in combat before. The unit had been conducting reconnaissance forays into Ousseltia Valley to the north when the attack through Faid Pass began. At 1. 50. 0, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to move immediately to Hadjeb el Aioun, and Alger was directed to report to Stack, who had just been placed in command of the hastily assembled CC C. All Alger knew when he reached the command post was that units on CC A’s front had been battered and that an unknown number of Germans had moved through Faid Pass. Stack and his entourage arrived at the command post at 0. Monday, February 1. Alger was only given preliminary information during the initial briefing. An hour later, two lieutenants from the regiment’s reconnaissance company gave him a firsthand account of the battle around Lessouda. Despite what they had seen, the two had little knowledge of the German strength and disposition. There were no terrain maps of the area for Alger to review. The march and counterattack orders for CC C were issued at 0. Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, the 1st Armored Division commander. Ward’s plan was based upon an intelligence estimate of 4. German tanks near Sidi Bou Zid. In fact, as he would later learn to his chagrin, there were more than 1. Ward’s order to Stack read as follows: ‘Mission to CC C…. This force will move south, and by fire and maneuver, destroy the enemy armored forces which have threatened our hold on the Sbeitla area. It will so conduct its maneuver to aid in the withdrawal of our forces in the vicinity of Djebel Ksaira, eventually withdrawing to the area north of Djebel Hamra for further action.’Two German armored divisions and part of a third, plus supporting units, waited near Sidi Bou Zid to obstruct Alger’s thrust and foil his mission. Against this formidable force, the Americans were sending an uninitiated tank battalion, reinforced by a tank destroyer company consisting of halftracks mounting 7. The frontal movement would be supported by the 6. Armored Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery A, and the 6th Armored Infantry Battalion, riding behind in halftracks. As the briefing continued, Alger learned that his tank battalion had been ordered to attack in a formation consisting of a column of companies, with the center wing back. Two platoons would be on line in a narrow front to provide depth, with the third platoon of each company toward the center rear in reserve. Each flank was to be covered by a heavy tank destroyer platoon. The commander of the 1st Armored Regiment, Colonel Peter C. Hains, explained the known geographical contours and features of the area to Alger. He advised him of the deep, irregular wadis in his path and indicated that they were passable at certain points. Only three maps were available, and those were all of a scale that provided little in the way of detail. There were still no terrain maps to work from. Worst of all, there had been no reconnaissance forward from the jump- off point to Sidi Bou Zid itself. At 0. 50. 0, Alger returned to the battalion assembly area and issued the march and attack orders to his men. At 0. 62. 0, his battalion moved out and headed from the jump- off position, three miles south of the road junction later to be known as Kern’s Crossroads. Between 0. 70. 0 and 1. As the battalion closed on the crossroads, Alger ordered his reconnaissance platoon to the right flank. He had selected Captain Province M. Winkler’s Company D to lead the attack. Captain John L. Peyton’s Company F came next, followed by the battalion assault guns, self- propelled artillery commanded by Lieutenant Leo J. Farber. In reserve, was Company E, under Captain Harris O.Machus and Major William W. Emory. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, and Companies B and C of the 6.Armored Artillery Battalion backed these forward elements.Tank destroyer platoons were located on each flank.
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